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Although the body is fundamental to observation and feeling, it’s experience of 
infection is regarded by the biomedical sciences and, concomitantly, by the social 
sciences as relatively obtuse: situating it as a mere object of inquiry. As if its intricate 
and highly complex dynamics are no more than an imperfect animated machine and, 
concomitantly, infection is a change to its normative mechanisms. In this brief 
comment piece, I ask: what might be afforded to the problematic diagnosis of 
communicable infection and, hence, for global health strategies of containment, if the 
body were appreciated as an active participant in diagnoses? To do so, I take up the 
‘pluralist panpsychist’ proposition that bodies think. Counter to the view that thinking 
is the preserve of the human mind and value is an ‘after’ ascribed to a given fact or 
situation, I experiment with the idea that the body’s  sensory awareness can be thought 
as a creative source of immanent values. Drawing on a series of empirical examples 
primarily focussed on the perceived novelty of Covid-19, I offer a preliminary sketch of 
how a revaluing the body as involved in decision-making and novelty might enrichen 
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In order to unravel the mystery of novel communicable infection when happening, 
biomedical diagnoses proceed on the presupposition that they are contending with a 
first order reality composed of material substances; whilst values make up a second 
order attributed by human subjectivity and may contaminate knowledge. This has led 
to the construction of what are presupposed as ‘value-free’ technical instruments and 
clinical evidence achieved by ‘value-free’ methods (see for example, Lacey 2004). 
Within the social sciences, on the other hand, the presumption that methods or 
instruments can be free of values created by human subjective judgment is highly 
contested. Value-laden cultural concepts and value-inscribed technical instruments, 
invariably, participate in the formulation of disease (Haraway 1997; Ong and Chen 
2010). Further, treatment and prevention interventions that follow a biomedical 
diagnosis do not necessarily cohere with the priorities and, thus, ascribed values of 
others (Chandler et al. 2015; Kelly, MacGregor, and Montgomery 2017; Fairhead 
2016). In sum, despite the contrast can be drawn between debates on the location of 
values, there is a shared view that they are the preserve only of subjective perception. 
Values either obscure factual knowledge or are implicitly inscribed in what is 
understood as factual.     
 
By consequence, although the body is fundamental to observation and feeling and, no 
less, at the centre of novel communicable infections, it is regarded  as relatively 
obtuse: a mere matter of substance and, thus, no more than a passive object in 
diagnostic decision-making. Its intricate and highly complex dynamics are thought as 
no more than an imperfect animated machine and, concomitantly, infection is a change 
to its normative mechanisms (see for example, Deeks and Walker 2007; Falasca et 
al. 2015; Randall and Griffin 2017). In what follows, I ask: what might be afforded to 
the problematic diagnosis of novel communicable infection and, hence, for global 
health strategies of containment, if the body were appreciated as an active participant 
in the creation of values? Counter to the prevailing view that value is merely an ‘after’ 
ascribed to a given fact or situation, I reflect on Martin Savransky’s (2019) ‘pluralist 
panpsychist’ proposition that the body thinks. Its sensory awareness creates values in 




The proposition is sourced from the speculative process philosophy of Alfred North 
Whitehead and the pluralist philosophy of William James. Both Whitehead and James 
challenge the contemporary scientific claim on reality that, as Whitehead (1920/1964: 
21) puts this, proceeds on the basis of having ‘bifurcated nature’: according to which 
reality is ‘there for knowledge; although on this theory it is never known. For what is 
known is the other sort of reality, which is the byplay of the mind’. If we follow 
Whitehead, the need for ‘value-free’ instruments and methods arises not from a first 
order material reality that can be contaminated by a second order, that is, by the 
conscious perception of the mind. It is due to a mode of thought that can be traced to 
the Kantian distinction between ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’: appearances, which 
constitute our experience and things which constitute reality. This dividing of nature, 
according to which values are conceived as if apart from and transcendental to 
infection, forecloses on what Whitehead (1979:222) claims is the universe’s ‘creative 
advance into novelty’.1 In effect, we are left with the implicit notion of ‘a static 
morphological universe’: a world composed of isolated stable substances.  
 
Having obfuscated our immanent and creative connectedness – precisely what might 
be said of infection – the bifurcation leads us to assume a given separation between 
consciousness and content. As if perception is apart from what draws it and where 
consciousness and, hence, the creation of values takes place within the human mind. 
However, by relinquishing this view, we may arrive at an appreciation for 
consciousness experienced in many forms (James 1907:8,9). Taking up the 
problematic of the bifurcation of nature and, more particularly, the proposition that 
there may be many forms of consciousness, Savransky suggests that bodies may be 
understood to constitute ‘modes of thought in their own right’. Their sensory 
awareness can be conceived to involve ‘the discernment of relevance, problem 
solving, decision making and feeling’ that express ‘values and aims’. Including values 
and aims that may ‘be characterised as divergent and unruly’ but, also, novel in 
response to the demands made of them by the environment (Savransky 2019:122).  
 
I approach Savransky’s proposition through the lens of Covid-19. The first two 
examples focus on what are regarded by biomedicine as Covid-19’s baffling novel 
disease effects. I suggest that the notion of novelty as the mysterious new might be 
altered with an appreciation of the body that thinks and, by consequence, is creative 
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of immanent values and, thus, insistent novelty. The third example focuses on a recent 
biomedical trial. Despite its inflection with ascribed social values, it reveals how an 
unwitting appreciation for the body’s creativity may be found in the interstices of 
biomedical research. It leads me to suggest that what gives impetus to the trial but, 
also, for modes of securitising against pathogenic infection is not a first order of 
isolated substances but, on the contrary, the immanent creative and connective work 
of values. In the conclusion, I draw on the above examples to extend their relevance 
to what Chandler et al. (2015) suggest of the problematic of imposing a scientific reality 




Arguably, the most dramatic novel bodily consequence of Covid-19 infection is ‘happy 
hypoxia’, a term given to people who are able to talk as if without distress, yet showing 
low oxygen levels that should mean that they are unconscious or even dead. As a 
recent scientific news article explained, in most people suffering COVID-19 ‘the body 
senses the rising levels of carbon dioxide that typically occur simultaneously as the 
lungs are unable to clear gas as efficiently. But in some… this response does not 
appear to be kicking in’ (Devlin 2020, my italics). As one clinician cited in a peer-
reviewed article describes it: ‘There is a mismatch [between] what we see on the 
monitor and what the patient looks like in front of us’. And, as another clinician says of 
the ‘mismatch’: ‘The brain is tuned to monitoring the carbon dioxide with various 
sensors … We don't sense our oxygen levels’ (Couzin-Frankel 2020, my italics). 
Although at first reading, it may seem that what is novel for biomedicine is the 
mismatch between consciousness and observable measures, ‘happy hypoxia’ is not 
new to science. It is well-known to occur in pilots flying at high altitudes where oxygen 
pressure in low (Cable 2003). Thus, what enables the identification of Covid-19 ‘happy 
hypoxia’ as novel is the mismatch in what is expected of microbial infection, when 
thought as a distinct temporal bodily event apart from the environment.  
 
According to the descriptions above, diagnoses of ‘happy hypoxia’ are made by 
abstracting oxygen levels from the body attached to a monitor and comparing them to 
measures statistically established in those of a ‘normal’ body. While the latter are 
crucial diagnostic indicators of difference, they are nonetheless imposed on an 
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individual body (Greco 2004:4). However, as Monica Greco notes, a distinction can 
be drawn between ‘normal’ measures devised from knowledge-making practices and 
what George Canguilhem proposed as the body’s ‘capacity to institute, or be the 
source of, norms’ (Greco 2004:3). Careful to acknowledge that there is an intimate 
relationship between what can be termed ‘social’ or ‘biomedically’ derived norms and 
‘organic’ norms in the formulation of a pathological condition, Greco suggests that the 
distinction is warranted if we are to avoid, as she puts this, reductively confusing 
‘organic possibilities’ with those that are ‘intelligible through their codification in 
knowledge’ (Greco 200:4). When confused, the body’s ‘dynamic adaptability’ 
according to its own normative constraints is elided (2004:3). Without presupposing in 
advance the scope of this adaptability, the body may be understood to have its own 
constraints that involve ‘a plurality of vital norms or values – that is, values pertaining 
to something like a “vital order”’ (Greco, 2004:9). This does not take away from the 
interdependency of the body for acquiring and negotiating its constraints in connection 
with its environment. As Canguilhem (2008, 113) states: ‘the living brings its own 
proper norms of appreciating situations, both dominating the milieu and 
accommodating itself to it’.  
 
While measures of low oxygen levels in the body are indicators of potential fatality, for 
biomedicine the measures are facts about a substance. Facts that acquire value when 
appreciated as essential to sustaining an obtuse machine-like body. Thus, the 
mismatch is ‘baffling’ because it does not confirm to an expectation of a machine-like 
obtuse substance. But if we take seriously the repeated reference to the body’s 
capacity to ‘sense’ and consider oxygen as a value created by the environment in 
place of the idea that it and the body are  isolatable substances to which value is 
attributed, we can begin to consider how the idea of a thinking body alters the 
conception of what makes ‘happy hypoxia’ novel. If oxygen is, itself, the achievement 
of immanent value,  its decreasing absence in relation to the divergent values created 
by microbial infection may be understood to call for multiple decisions to be made by 
the body ‘all the way down’ (Savransky, 2019:119). Decisions whose consequences 
are expressed in different spatio-temporal ways, sustaining for a period a site of 
consciousness that, despite its limited sensory capacity, is privileged by a Cartesian 
dualism over the sensory capacities of the body (Descartes, 1996) and, accordingly, 
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where diagnosis is proceeds having already accepted a bifurcated conception of 
experience. 
 
While the biomedical approach to ‘happy hypoxia’ can be shown to have pragmatic 
currency for intervening through the administer of oxygen, the ‘normal’ parameters of 
the body established according to biomedical norms can be said to express, as 
Savransky suggests, novel aims and values. For the body, a process of revaluation 
may be said to be taking place. From this point of view, ‘happy hypoxia’ is not an 
aberration in the ‘state’ of a normal body presupposed as an isolated entity apart from 
its environment. It is the achievement of a diagnosis made and acted on by the body 
as an interested participant in response to its milieu (at a minimum, microbial infection 
and its respiratory relation to air). Interested to the degree that it discerns values that 
conflict with it and, in the event of ‘happy hypoxia’, may not succeed. Although not 
different in expression to ‘happy hypoxia’ in a pilot, when created in response to 
COVID-19 it is instructive of the presupposed distinction that biomedicine makes 
between consciousness and content but, also, between bodily infection and the 
environment. 
 
The bafflement provoked by ‘happy hypoxia’ is also evident in the difficulty that 
biomedicine has experienced in specifying other Covid-19 disease effects. Of the 
many examples that might be considered here, ‘Long Covid’ is now acknowledged to 
have expressly challenged the usual taxonomy used to distinguish the likelihood of 
long-term disease effects. Initially side-lined by a taxonomy of ‘mild’, ‘moderate’ and 
‘severe infection’, the latter involving hospitalisation, patient groups have more 
recently gained acknowledgement of an array of felt effects that do not conform to the 
cessation of ‘mild’ or ‘moderate’ infection (see Callard, 2020; Public Health England 
2020; Yelin et al 2020). Again, based on what I have suggested above, we could say 
that a microbial infection furnishes new values with which the body continues to ‘think’ 
beyond biomedical determinations of the temporality of infection affixed to a locatable 
microbial substance. Indeed, in this regard, there are numerous other communicable 
infections that could be included here. For example, the ‘novel’ emergence of ‘Ebola 
Relapse’ that caught biomedicine by surprise and has led to a rethinking of the 
infection as ‘persisting’ in novel ways, despite situated diagnostic testing that showed 




Values in the interstices of biomedical inquiry 
 
I turn now to an area of medical inquiry that is implicitly engaged in an appreciation of 
the body’s capacity to create immanent values but where attention only to ‘socially’ 
ascribed values can distract from its possibilities. Although antibodies are often 
portrayed to be additional components - ‘facts’, acquired by the body as a potential 
armament against pathogenic infection - they do not come from nowhere. That is to 
say, they are not simply new components attributed value for potentially arresting or 
thwarting infection, they are created in response to infection either by the body or by 
a vaccine to stimulate its response. In an attempt to learn more from the potentiality of 
antibody protection, numerous laboratory and clinical studies are currently taking 
place. One such attempt has been a biomedical trial in the United Kingdom seeking to 
establish whether transfusing antibodies produced by those who have had COVID-19 
might facilitate an immune response in those seriously ill with the disease.  
 
What initially drew my attention to the trial was the barring of gay and bisexual men 
from donating their blood plasma to the clinical trial based on the stigmatisation of 
diverse sexualities and affixed to knowledge about the transmission of HIV infection. 
And not, according to the ‘value-free’ technical instruments of diagnosis that could 
have demonstrated that these volunteers were no more likely to pass on HIV than 
others. Here we might read their barring as an example of how a negative ‘social’ 
value (in the sense of ‘worth’) is ascribed to a category of persons challenged by 
biomedical diagnostics, while maintaining or contesting that diagnostic tests are value-
free. But, in doing so, we risk eliding the potential of immanent value sought by the 
trial. That is to say, we risk leaving out of a diagnosis the body’s capacity for creativity, 
even though this is evident in the seeking out of novel ‘antibodies. Paradoxically, it 
could be said, it is the creation of immanent value by the body that enables ascribed 
value by biomedicine.   
 
Although those conducting the trial would not describe their aim as seeking out and 
putting to test values created by bodies in response to their milieu, the trial is exploring 
their potential value to others. It can be considered a discerning response by 
biomedicine to the body’s capacities to discern and, in a manner, that selects for, 
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rather than against, the connectedness achieved by infection. To put this another way, 
what we see here is a counter to the confusing presupposition that life is composed of 
stable isolated substances and enacted through securitisation measures of    
‘quarantining’ (frequently put in place in response to other communicable infections), 
‘self-isolation’, ‘social distancing’ and variable requirements for face masks.  Measures 





What I have proposed in this brief commentary on diagnosis does not take away the 
need to examine the values that are imposed as an ‘after’ to what is presupposed as 
fact. Rather, it suggests that all values warrant scrutiny for their relevance to the 
situation in which they are created. I also want to make clear that the examples that I 
have discussed above are not intended to provide a ‘solution’ to the experience of 
COVID-19, as would be expected of a medical or, indeed, a socio-political diagnosis. 
By populating a diagnosis with values as immanent to the body, my aim has been to 
cultivate an appreciation for novelty that may enrichen the scope of biomedical 
diagnosis. Contrary to the idea that novelty is merely indicative of a process gone 
awry, by conceiving novelty as an achievement of an immanently creative process, in 
effect a process of revaluing values, new questions may emerge that give scope to 
the body as the centre piece of infection.  
 
Although it is beyond the focus of this paper to give sufficient attention to what Kelly 
et al (2017:2) raise of ‘lived science and medicine realities on the ground’ that conflict 
with the lived experiences of those for whom they are intended, I want to finish by 
drawing a connection between this problematic and what I have raised of novelty and 
immanent values. In response to the problematic, Chandler et al (2015) suggest that 
there is a mistaken claim that communities who do not readily concede to biomedically 
informed global health strategies are, themselves, mistaken or ignorant in their 
evaluations of value. On the basis of what I have outlined, we could say that the 
mistake resides with the bifurcation of nature that reduces values to mere ascriptions 
and, in doing so, remains indifferent to the felt values of others. While diagnosis 
premised on a separation between facts and values may succeed in temporally 
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thwarting or assuaging a particular communicable infection, it will not make the 
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1 Further clarification on what Whitehead intends by the notion of value can be found 
in Science and the Modern World (1967:94), where he states: ‘“Value” is the word I 





and through the poetic view of nature. We have only to transfer to the very texture of 
realization in itself that which we recognize so readily in terms of human life’.  
 
